This inaugural post is a short one. Earlier this week, Ebrahim Raisi became the new president of Iran. There has been a lot of informed speculation about the structure of the regime. The consensus, which I agree with, is that the president is an administrator, not a policymaker.
There are several pillars of power in Iran which, during the 42 years of the regime’s rule, have had different degrees of influence. There are also overlaps among these factions.
The first is the supreme leader, or simply leader in Farsi. Ali Khamenei is old, and he is reportedly struggling with cancer. His authority comes from Iran’s constitution, but it also comes from the regime’s base of support. On paper at least, his authority is unlimited as he is officially the deputy of the messiah on earth. Those who form the foundation of the regime within the populous, mostly dedicated Muslims, many thanks to decades of regime propaganda, concede that he is a holy figure, hence his power to be divine.
Below the surface, his financial empire is estimated to be $200 billion, making him one of the wealthiest humans on earth, which gives him a lot of power to buy loyalty.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the most powerful entity after Khamenei, if not already more powerful than the old man. The IRGC used to not be a big actor, but, in the 2000s, the regime began a series of industrial “privatization.” In reality, most public industries transferred their ownerships to the IRGC. The IRGC controls somewhere between 20 percent and 50 percent of Iran’s GDP. On top of that, it has all the guns and is Iran’s largest and more generous employer.
After 2009, there was an ideological cleansing inside the IRGC. Following mass protests, those who expressed support for the people and against the fraudulent election were eliminated, be it through forced retirement or assassination.
The rank and file of the IRGC is different. High rates of unemployment, poverty, and financial problems have made many young people without strong ideological preferences quite desperate. In the meantime, the IRGC is the only reliable employer. Most young people refuse to join the murderous entity, but so many also join reluctantly and without any ideological agreement, and so often despite resenting the paramilitary organization.
The IRGC’s rise came at the cost of the clergy. The clergy and the IRGC still are the two largest political players in Iran, and, on the surface, they are on the same page. Below the surface, there is little love lost as they are political rivals. The clergy is still quite wealthy, thanks to the donations from the average Iranian and the revenue from the national budget. Kleptocrat clerics also have their own local militias. Most importantly, their followers are smaller in number than the IRGC’s membership, but they are ideologically dedicated, unlike the IRGC’s mercenary rank and file.
There are second-tier entities. The parliament, or the majlis, the guardian council, the expediency council, and the presidency are all powerful in their own rights, but not as much as the three other entities. More complicated is that, almost entirely, the individual actors in those organizations are all members of the previous three pillars of power—diehard Khamenei followers, the clergy, and the IRGC.
There are overlaps here. Some individuals belong to two or several of these factions. Further, each of these entities has its own sub-factions. The myth of the reformists in Iran is not that there are no reformists. Especially within the clergy, there are sincere reformists. They are either prevented from rising within the ranks or handicapped once at a position of leadership, as was the case for the generals the IRGC cleansed in 2009, or for grand ayatollahs such as the late Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Youssef Sanei who have been sidelined for decades, or Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—at a later time, I will have a post about Rafsanjani, an evil man whose Nietzschean thirst for power and wealth could have had positive impacts if not sidelined—who might have been murdered by the regime.
Raisi’s (s)election could be the most impactful development in Iran since Khamenei’s ascent to supreme leadership. It is probable that Khamenei, currently 82 and struggling with cancer, will not make it through Raisi’s presidency. Raisi is the only presidential candidate to run a second time after initial defeat and win. It is widely speculated that he will be Iran’s next supreme leader—Khamenei was president when Khomeini died, and he transitioned into supreme leadership. When he was defeated in 2017, there were questions about whether he could become supreme leader in the future since the people had rejected him. His victory earlier this year fixes this problem. He also checks all the right boxes: He has deep ties with the ascendent hardline clergy and the IRGC, he is a seyed—meaning a descendent of Muhammed, a necessity to become supreme leader all but officially—and he is young enough to prevent a succession crisis for decades to come. As the former longtime inspector general, he also has dirt on everybody. There is an interesting anecdote here. At a presidential debate, when asked why he had not been more forceful on prosecuting corruption, he walked over to the other side of the stage to give Rouhani, who had asked the question, a paper. Raisi then said, “do you think it would have been prudent to reveal the corruption of these people? If yes, please read them out loud.” Rouhani caved.
If Khamenei dies and Raisi succeeds him, it will be fascinating to see which factions Raisi will empower, the IRGC, the clergy, the Khamenei clan who will inherit his wealth and semi-holy popularity among the regime’s base, or a compromise among these factions. It will be a while until he could grow his own roots as the supreme leader—mythical popularity, loyalty, and wealth. His actions as president could be an early tell, or it could be just playing the long game. He has strong ties with all three factions, however. On the other hand, he is not alone in aspiring for supreme leadership. There are many out there who also want the job, including Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and he could be set up for failure as president to make him an unacceptable alternative.
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