I suppose I’m mistaken but I had always thought the US had the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons - by far. I remember hearing that the missile gap in the Cold War was a bit of a myth created by the Kennedy Admin and that the real missile gap was the other way around: the US had something like an order of magnitude more nukes than the Russians, who actually did not have many. But the narrative that the Russians had a lot helped fuel US arms-race build-up.
Am I completely wrong? Or is it just that a lot has changed since 1961? Or is the case that the US has more overall but the Russians have more low-yield nukes?
A lot has changed! New START caps “strategic” (high yield) nukes at 1,550 for the two countries to deploy. Each country has around 2,000 more retired (not attached to a delivery system). In the overall inventory, however, Russia has around 700 more warheads, almost all theater weapons. The overall warheads are 6,200 Russia and 5,500 the United States. The advantage we *will* have in the coming years with the modernization efforts will be better delivery systems. The Russian advantage is there their high yield weapons (so called strategic) are significantly larger and more destructive. (Tsar Bomba is the largest destination in history, over 1,000 times larger than what we dropped in Hiroshima at the equivalent of 25 megatons of TNT—Hiroshima bomb was 21 kilotons of TNT equivalent.) another advantage they have is that if we are talking about European defense here, all of their warheads are deployed nearby, while ours are distant from Russia. But off we are talking about homeland defense, it’s our advantage that we have weapons deployed in Europe, but they have none deployed in our neighborhood. Also, we generally have a better missile defense shield and more time to shoot their missiles down before arriving here. Then again, if we’re talking about defending Estonia, let’s say, they’ll destroy us in the theater because of the number of the theater weapons they have. Then there is the exotic weapons they, like nuclear-armed tanks or the Poseidon nuclear torpedo which could come near our shores and create a tsunami in New York for instance. It’s quite dystrophic. But as for numbers, they have 700 more warheads.
A correction. Flight MH17 was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur when it was shot down, by ‘unknown’ agents.
Otherwise I generally agree. Russia’s military has had an appalling reputation, with many reports of violence against new conscripts leading to widespread public anger. Putin has obviously settled on reducing a reliance on it, beefing his armoury with cyber and covert ops, such as the little green men. Additionally he has the shady Wagner private army at his call, to do the things that he or his global supporters need without any recourse to the Kremlin.
I disagree on the Baltic’s, but only slightly. My friends there have always maintained that they would defend themselves against any Russian aggression, and despite the large numbers of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, it is likely that any Russian attempts at interference would be at the cyber and disinformation level rather than outright aggression that would trigger a military response. Indeed, there have been a number of attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the three states. There is no Baltic Sudetenland.
The Baltic Republics are indefensible. However, what would Putin gain by occupying them? Russian is counting on commercial agreements with Europe for the sale of hydrocarbon products. Unless the Russians are provoked, it is unlikely they will invade the Baltic states. Putin is a leader that one can negotiate with. Unfortunately, America's domestic problems are so severe that they will be the paramount concern of the government over the next decade or so.
Thank you for your erudite comment. I consider Mr. Putin to a ruthless and pragmatic dictator. I believe Russia's financial position is precarious, and I don't think he will do anything to jeopardize it. When he felt his country's vital interests were at stake (Crimea, Syria) he would act. However, in other cases, he will negotiate.
Ehhhh....I think that as such, Putin has likely "made up his mind" before he acts and that any claimed leverage in "negotiations" is something he likely already considered and thus either didn't act or dismissed as an empty threat. For him to take an initiative and then back down because of a "negotiation" is something he would consider as weakness. Do you have an example of him doing this?
Again, I don't think he would put himself in a position where he would have to back down. Nord Stream is an example of Realpolitik. It is to the advantage of both Russia and Germany to have the pipeline in place. In order to get this deal done Putin will have to be reasonable in his relationships with his neighbours.
That's what I said, he wouldn't put himself in such a position. I just don't share your confidence that as things stand, invading the Baltics would always be such a position, if he believes that other European countries have sticky economic relationships with him that are hard to get out of such as dependence for energy. He would seek to orient diplomacy to the bilateral level, where third parties stay out of his relations with the Baltics.
I just don't see any vital interest for Russia in the Baltics. Russia did have vital interests in Crimea (Sevastopol naval base) and the Donbas (a large indigenous Russian population). I just think the ramifications of an altercation with the Baltics would be severe. NATO is deliberately stationing troops there, and I have no doubt they would fight alongside troops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should the Russians attack.
I understand the occupations of Georgian and Ukrainian territory. I don't know or understand how Transdneister benefits Russia. Is it just a base of operations for the southern Slav lands?
If you want to talk about Moldova exclusively and from a military point of view, it’s a greater access to the Black Sea and of course the oil fields there. But there is a larger point of ideological and national honor incentives of regaining the lost Soviet territories.
It creates political complexity in the region, and provides a buffer for Russia. Putin’s approach over recent decades has been to sow instability in the states nearby, as a means to prevent incursions, hard or soft into its backyard.
I suppose I’m mistaken but I had always thought the US had the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons - by far. I remember hearing that the missile gap in the Cold War was a bit of a myth created by the Kennedy Admin and that the real missile gap was the other way around: the US had something like an order of magnitude more nukes than the Russians, who actually did not have many. But the narrative that the Russians had a lot helped fuel US arms-race build-up.
Am I completely wrong? Or is it just that a lot has changed since 1961? Or is the case that the US has more overall but the Russians have more low-yield nukes?
A lot has changed! New START caps “strategic” (high yield) nukes at 1,550 for the two countries to deploy. Each country has around 2,000 more retired (not attached to a delivery system). In the overall inventory, however, Russia has around 700 more warheads, almost all theater weapons. The overall warheads are 6,200 Russia and 5,500 the United States. The advantage we *will* have in the coming years with the modernization efforts will be better delivery systems. The Russian advantage is there their high yield weapons (so called strategic) are significantly larger and more destructive. (Tsar Bomba is the largest destination in history, over 1,000 times larger than what we dropped in Hiroshima at the equivalent of 25 megatons of TNT—Hiroshima bomb was 21 kilotons of TNT equivalent.) another advantage they have is that if we are talking about European defense here, all of their warheads are deployed nearby, while ours are distant from Russia. But off we are talking about homeland defense, it’s our advantage that we have weapons deployed in Europe, but they have none deployed in our neighborhood. Also, we generally have a better missile defense shield and more time to shoot their missiles down before arriving here. Then again, if we’re talking about defending Estonia, let’s say, they’ll destroy us in the theater because of the number of the theater weapons they have. Then there is the exotic weapons they, like nuclear-armed tanks or the Poseidon nuclear torpedo which could come near our shores and create a tsunami in New York for instance. It’s quite dystrophic. But as for numbers, they have 700 more warheads.
Interesting. Thanks for explaining all of that.
A correction. Flight MH17 was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur when it was shot down, by ‘unknown’ agents.
Otherwise I generally agree. Russia’s military has had an appalling reputation, with many reports of violence against new conscripts leading to widespread public anger. Putin has obviously settled on reducing a reliance on it, beefing his armoury with cyber and covert ops, such as the little green men. Additionally he has the shady Wagner private army at his call, to do the things that he or his global supporters need without any recourse to the Kremlin.
I disagree on the Baltic’s, but only slightly. My friends there have always maintained that they would defend themselves against any Russian aggression, and despite the large numbers of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, it is likely that any Russian attempts at interference would be at the cyber and disinformation level rather than outright aggression that would trigger a military response. Indeed, there have been a number of attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the three states. There is no Baltic Sudetenland.
The Baltic Republics are indefensible. However, what would Putin gain by occupying them? Russian is counting on commercial agreements with Europe for the sale of hydrocarbon products. Unless the Russians are provoked, it is unlikely they will invade the Baltic states. Putin is a leader that one can negotiate with. Unfortunately, America's domestic problems are so severe that they will be the paramount concern of the government over the next decade or so.
Thank you for your erudite comment. I consider Mr. Putin to a ruthless and pragmatic dictator. I believe Russia's financial position is precarious, and I don't think he will do anything to jeopardize it. When he felt his country's vital interests were at stake (Crimea, Syria) he would act. However, in other cases, he will negotiate.
Ehhhh....I think that as such, Putin has likely "made up his mind" before he acts and that any claimed leverage in "negotiations" is something he likely already considered and thus either didn't act or dismissed as an empty threat. For him to take an initiative and then back down because of a "negotiation" is something he would consider as weakness. Do you have an example of him doing this?
Again, I don't think he would put himself in a position where he would have to back down. Nord Stream is an example of Realpolitik. It is to the advantage of both Russia and Germany to have the pipeline in place. In order to get this deal done Putin will have to be reasonable in his relationships with his neighbours.
That's what I said, he wouldn't put himself in such a position. I just don't share your confidence that as things stand, invading the Baltics would always be such a position, if he believes that other European countries have sticky economic relationships with him that are hard to get out of such as dependence for energy. He would seek to orient diplomacy to the bilateral level, where third parties stay out of his relations with the Baltics.
I just don't see any vital interest for Russia in the Baltics. Russia did have vital interests in Crimea (Sevastopol naval base) and the Donbas (a large indigenous Russian population). I just think the ramifications of an altercation with the Baltics would be severe. NATO is deliberately stationing troops there, and I have no doubt they would fight alongside troops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should the Russians attack.
I understand the occupations of Georgian and Ukrainian territory. I don't know or understand how Transdneister benefits Russia. Is it just a base of operations for the southern Slav lands?
If you want to talk about Moldova exclusively and from a military point of view, it’s a greater access to the Black Sea and of course the oil fields there. But there is a larger point of ideological and national honor incentives of regaining the lost Soviet territories.
It creates political complexity in the region, and provides a buffer for Russia. Putin’s approach over recent decades has been to sow instability in the states nearby, as a means to prevent incursions, hard or soft into its backyard.